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One of the most striking effects of globalization and geospatial response 
to it was regionalization of social processes, that is formation of territorial 
(regional) communities of various sizes which have certain internal cohe-
sion: political, historical, cultural, civilizational, economic and others. 
Reginalization manifests itself at both international and domestic levels. In 
this context “de jure” there emerge and usually superimpose on each other 
regional communities (using the political-geographical terminology of 
V. A. Kolosov). They are created deliberately and are easy to control. They 
develop dynamically and are more sustainable over time. While in “de 
facto” [1] communities, which are not set up deliberately, control is either weak 
or there is no control but their formation took a long historical period. The first 
or the second type of regional community and regionalization processes are 
conditioned by a set of specific historical factors of regionalization.  
 From the point of view of nature and mechanisms, (driving force) re-
gionalization processes (both international and domestic) are expressed in 
the form of two interrelated trends — disintegration (decay or its threat to 
states and their associations, accompanied by appearece of new countries, 
sub regions, regions) and integration (formation of regional communities as 
a result of merging of territorial-political actors).  
 These specific features of regionalization are particularly important for 
analysis and understanding of the specificity of the post-Soviet space. How-
ever, identification of current trends also requires taking into account the 
nature of the preceding historical development of the geospace in which 
these processes occur.  
 The formation of the Eurasian macro region, which was at the cross-
roads of Europe and Asia, took four centuries. It developed in collaboration 
between Slavic-Orthodox, Western, Islamic and neighboring civilizations. It 
was ethno-culturally, geographically and civilizationally specific, different 
from European, Asian, etc. entities. As a regional geopolitical “de jure” sys-
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tem, that was formed on multi-civilizational basis, it went, in the course of 
its development, through four stages which were different from the point of 
view of socio-political history or regional geopolitical eras: pre-empire 
epoch (Moscow State), empire epoch (Russian empire), Soviet (USSR) and 
post-Soviet (Russia and post-Soviet states). Each of them was characterized 
by a specific geopolitical space of political and spiritual domination and 
influence.  
There was a gradually increasing internal regionalization that was par-
ticularly noticeable at the territorial and political levels. This is seen, for 
example, in the different status of the colonial margins in comparison with 
the rest of the administrative-territorial units in the imperial space, in the 
nation-state and cultural autonomization of the Soviet space under the Soviet 
federalism and, finally, in active sovereignization of the Eurasian geopoliti-
cal system which transformed into post-Soviet space. The process of gradual 
economic regionalization of the Eurasian region is also obvious. During the 
Soviet geopolitical era it ultimately led to the formation of eighteen major 
economic regions. This is the result of the impact of a complex of historical 
factors of regionalization on the Eurasian regional community. This is espe-
cially obvious in the case of the post-Soviet space formation. 
 The process of disintegration of the Soviet Union, as a prerequisite for 
the emergence of new post-Soviet regional communities, was due to a com-
plex of disintegrating regionalization factors — both external (the “cold” 
war between the socialist and capitalist systems, the crisis and collapse of the 
socialist system in Europe in the late 1980s — early 1990s, etc.) and inter-
nal, inside the Soviet Union. In particular, the socio-economic and ideologi-
cal crises of the Soviet social order in the first half of the 1980s led to its 
radical change in the course of restructuring (“perestroika” in 1985—1991) 
which, in its turn, resulted in new socio-economic and political problems 
such as ethnic conflicts, separatism of national political elites in the Soviet 
and autonomous republics. This was enhanced by “civilizational diversity” 
of Soviet society which consisted of a mixture of different ethno-
confessional fragments of major civilizations: Slavic-Orthodox, Western, 
Islamic, Buddhist. Their “fusion” on the basis of communist ideology laid a 
foundation for building a new “Soviet” Civilization. The disintegration trend 
of Soviet regionalization of the Soviet and the then post-Soviet space mani-
fested itself not only in the “parade” of sovereignty of the Federal Republics 
in the early 1990s, but in the emergence, during ethnic conflicts, of self-
proclaimed, internationally unrecognized republics which have become cen-
ters of sustainable regional conflicts.  
 Finally, the above mentioned type of regionalization of the post-Soviet 
space was stimulated by intensification of integration processes in Europe 
(expansion of the EU and other European bodies, NATO, etc.), by emer-
gence in the adjacent to the Eurasian space of new regional (Turkey, Iran, 
India, Pakistan) and global-regional (China) countries, as well as new re-
gional problems and conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo). They have be-
come powerful factors of new regionalism.  
 At the same time factors of integration regionalization which helped 
shape the post-Soviet space were: still common geographic and neighboring 
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location of the new territorial and political entities, their long historical de-
velopment in the framework of the Eurasian region and, as a consequence, 
the current political and socio-cultural unity of the nations, a common trans-
port system and strong economic ties conditioned by the centrally planned 
economy of the Soviet Union and a historically traditional financial and eco-
nomic dependence of the peripheral national sub-regions on Russia. Besides, 
integration was objectively stimulated by the increasing global and regional 
challenges and threats to the development of young states (international ter-
rorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.).  
 The considered above set of preconditions, factors and development pe-
culiarities of the countries resulted not only in “launching” regionalization 
processes in the post-Soviet space but also determined a four level structure 
of these processes. These processes are realized, with varying degrees of 
brightness, at the international (macro regional), sub-regional, intra-regional 
and country levels. 
 The international integration level is the most obvious one. It had a 
considerable impact on the other levels. It is manifested in the created “de 
jure” post-Soviet space states, in international regional communities — re-
gional unions and international organizations of economic, political and 
integral (complex) character with strong management functions. And it is 
increasingly obvious that the dominant geopolitical vectors of development 
trends of such international integration processes are European, (Euro-
central) and Eurasian (Russia-central) which manifested themselves al-
ready in 1991. They became vectors of the “de jure” regionalization of the 
post-Soviet space.  
 The chronology of regionalization of the Soviet space and the beginning 
of its transformation into a post-Soviet one was, as it is well known, tran-
sient: the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) withdrew from the 
Union in the summer of 1991; on December 8, 1991 some republics, foun-
ders of the Soviet Union withdrew, on December 31, 1922 Belarus, Russia 
and Ukraine signed an agreement on the formation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) which officially declared elimination of the Soviet 
Union and stated their desire for voluntary cooperation in political, eco-
nomic, humanitarian and other spheres. On 21st of December in Alma-Ata 
(then the capital of the Kazakh SSR) they were joined by Azerbaijan (actu-
ally since 1993), Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan who signed the Declaration on the purposes and 
principles of the CIS. In 1993 Georgia acceded to it.  
 Regionalization processes which took place later on the European 
(Western) and the Eurasian vectors of the post-Soviet space acquired spe-
cific features: in the “de facto” space of the Eurasian region two “de jure” 
new geopolitical sub-regions — the Baltic and the Eurasian ones were 
formed.  
The European vector of inter-state regionalization is re-presented pri-
marily by the Euro-Baltic sub-region which included three former Soviet 
republics of the Soviet Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Their 
national political elites chose the path of integration into the West European 
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regional institutions and a historic return to the fold of Western civilization. 
That was the first step in regionalization of what was still the Soviet space in 
the summer of 1991. Further stages of realization of the Western vector of 
integration and that of the formation of a new sub-regional community were: 
creation by these countries of the Baltic Assembly, their joining the Vishe-
grad Group (Central European Free Trade Area), the Western European Un-
ion, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, 
the EBRD and other European economic structures, and, finally, meeting the 
necessary conditions for joining the core integration institutions of the West, 
and, eventually, in 2004 joining the European Union and the NATO. This 
considerably strengthened and helped finalize the formation of the Baltic 
sub-regional dimension of the pan-regional community. The Russian exclave 
on the Baltic coast of the Kaliningrad region (“Eurasian Baltic”) became the 
“destroyer” of its territorial, political and civilization integrity. 
 For the majority of the post-Soviet states the Eurasian vector of inte-
gration processes became the most powerful one and in the 1990-ies and the 
first decade of the new century it led to the formation of several international 
and regional organizations among which the CIS played a key role in the 
formation of the post-Soviet space. The Commonwealth is the main outcome 
of its “de jure” regionalization.  
Modern Commonwealth (in 2007) was 22, 25 million km2, with a popu-
lation of around 280 million people (5 % of the world population). It ac-
counted for 5 % of the world GDP (3 % of which falls on Russia), 10 % of 
the world's industrial capacity and 25 % of core natural resources. Agricul-
tural lands account for 11 % of the world total but only a quarter of them are 
favorable for agriculture.  
 The main goal of the union was reintegration of the sovereign states 
into built on new principles international regional inter-governmental or-
ganization with a single political, economic and social space. The Charter of 
the CIS envisaged a vast scope for joint activities based on: ensuring human 
rights and freedoms, coordination of foreign policy and security, diverse 
economic cooperation, joint development of transport and communications, 
protection of health and environment, joint defense and protection of state 
borders, social and migration policies, combating organized crime and oth-
ers. Necessary institutions were established to implement these goals: more 
than fifty inter-state consultative and coordinating bodies, including the Ex-
ecutive Committee, Council of Heads of States and Heads of Governments, 
Council of ministers for foreign affairs and defense, inter-state and inter-
governmental councils for the most important areas of economy (energy, 
transport, communication and innovation), Inter-parliamentary Assembly 
and others. This created such a structure of international relations that could 
take into account the varying degree of readiness of the countries to inte-
grate. Each of the states had an opportunity to participate in the integration 
processes to the extent and in the directions that met its national interests [2]. 
There were also three political centers of the Commonwealth — Minsk, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg which housed the main inter-state coordinating 
bodies, thus giving the cites a regional status in the post-Soviet space.  
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 Russia’s role as that of a natural historic integration nucleus distin-
guished the Commonwealth from other regional unions and from similar, in 
terms of the type of social order, countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
which also were undergoing international integration during the period of a 
radical transformation of their societies. Political, socio-economic and ideo-
logical transformations of the former socialist society into a new post social-
ist society became the main feature of the CIS development. These truly 
revolutionary changes took place through drawing on historical experience 
(including not very modern or progressive) of the Western countries (espe-
cially European ones) which in the twentieth century were already markedly 
socialized and, for the most part, post capitalist. These countries supported 
the changes. That is why the most accurate term for the set of changes that 
have occurred and have affected the integration processes is “Westerniza-
tion of society” not “capitalization”, even though it also takes place. How-
ever, geopolitical vectors, pace, depth and results of the reforms have been 
uneven in the Central-Eastern Europe and in the CIS.  
 Judging by most aspects of multifaceted activities, the Commonwealth 
can be considered quite an international regional organization. Among its 
undoubted achievements especially in the initial and most difficult crisis 
period of development of the states (1992—1997) are the following: preser-
vation of the main features of cultural-historical and economic ties in the 
post-Soviet space, smooth and peaceful (as opposed to disintegrating during 
the time of bloody ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia) development of a new 
statehood, political and socio-economic reforms (in most countries transition 
to a multiparty parliamentary system, establishment of mechanisms and in-
frastructure of a market economy, etc.), regime of free trade between coun-
tries, visa-free movement of people, a monetary union, which was the basis 
of the Russian Ruble (in 1993), deterrence of regional conflicts in the post-
Soviet space, combating external threats.  
But gradually these integration benefits subsided and disintegration 
trends increased due to a number of new factors of regionalization, which 
in the second half of 1990s strengthened the trend of disintegration of the 
post-Soviet space.  
 This was initially enhanced by the vague legal and institutional frame-
work of the Commonwealth and almost a complete absence of financial in-
struments and mechanisms for cooperation. Unlike many other international 
organizations, the founding documents of the CIS did not formulate the ul-
timate goal for the states to achieve; they did not impose obligations (the 
principle of freedom of choice of fields of interaction) but stated the willing-
ness of the states to cooperate [2]. But there were more significant objective 
factors which stimulated the centrifugal tendencies.  
 Among the first to be mentioned was the different pace of political and 
socio-economic reforms in the post-Soviet countries in 1990s: faster and 
more radical in Russia, Kazakhstan and later in Azerbaijan; retarded and 
slow in the Ukraine, Moldavia; ethno-central in Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan. This was due to the numerous typological differences 
between the countries. These differences were of geographical, historical, 
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cultural, civilisational, political, demographic and economic character. In the 
USSR those countries were “canned” and were in highly centralized condi-
tions. Later, in the process of sovereignization of the former Soviet republics 
they strongly upheld the trend and became a foundation for disintegration 
processes.  
Thus, in terms of the size of the territory (17,1 million km2 and, there-
fore, in terms of natural resources and population (142,5 million people out 
of 270 million people of the Commonwealth in 2007) Russia considerably 
exceeds any of the countries and even their totals. Armenia, Moldova and 
Georgia have the minimal indicators of the above figures. The considerable 
resources and demographic potential of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan can ensure their successful economic development and can attract 
foreign investment. The rate of population growth also differs markedly: 
from natural decrease of population in the Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Arme-
nia, Moldova and Belarus (–0,7—0,3 %) to a speedy growth in Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (1,1—2 %). Accordingly, there 
are marked differences and contrasting features of GDP (from 2,1 trillions 
of $ U. S. in Russia, 0,33 trillion $ U. S. in the Ukraine, 0,17 in Kazakhstan 
to under 0,02 in Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 0,1 in 
Moldova in 2007); as well as GDP per capita (from almost 15 thousand dol-
lars in Russia, up to 6—7 in Kazakhstan, Belarus and the Ukraine; up to the 
minimal 1,5—3 in Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia). The countries hold differ-
ent places as to the quality of life (human development index): for the major-
ity it is estimated (according to the UN for 2007) as average, while in Bela-
rus and Russia it is the highest. The places in the world Table of Ranking 
(out of 187 countries) are also different — from a reasonably high in Russia 
(57) and Belarus (62) up to unpleasantly low (among 90+) for Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan and the lowest (110) for Moldova 
(113) and Tajikistan (116).  
 Finally, historical civilizational identities of the countries of the Com-
monwealth are also different. This reemerged once again in the process of 
disintegration of the Soviet Union which, in the course of eight decades, was 
forming a new Soviet civilization. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
Georgia and Armenia refer to Eastern Christian (Slavic-Orthodox) civiliza-
tion while Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries belong to Islamic civiliza-
tion. At the same time in the West of the Ukraine and Belarus there are 
fragments of Western civilization, while in Russia and some other subjects 
there are fragments of Islamic and Buddhist civilization.  
 The differences of internal political modes of the countries and the ex-
tent of their support by the West were the reflection of civilization peculiari-
ties, Soviet style including:  
 from democratic (according to Western standards the Ukraine and 
Georgia were the closest to these standards) to authoritarian-democratic (ac-
cording to the same standards Russia, Kazakhstan) and to strictly authoritar-
ian in Central Asian states and Belarus. The second and, perhaps, the most 
powerful factor of division in the post-Soviet space was the economic crisis 
and reduction of the GDP volume of in 1990s (more than by 50 % by 1991 
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in Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, the Ukraine) and, as a conse-
quence, a reduction and discontinuation of the traditional economic ties that 
have historically focused on each other, their reorientation to the new foreign 
partners in Europe, Asia and America which was also accompanied by ad-
justing and changing of foreign policy priorities.  
 In 2000—2005 the average annual rate of economic growth in the CIS 
countries was the highest in the world (8 %), significantly higher than the 
average (5 %) rate of the European Union (1 %) and in most developing 
countries. During the same period the aggregate GDP in the CIS grew up to 
39 %, the industrial output — up to by 40 %, agricultural output — 20 %, 
foreign trade turnover increased by 2,5 times.  
But in spite of the rapid development, given the large-scale reductions in 
GDP in 1990s, (in most countries by 40—60 % by 1991) in 2006, on aver-
age for the CIS, it was possible to only reach the level of the Soviet period 
indicators of 1991. Only six countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uz-
bekistan, Azerbaijan and Russia) were able to exceed these indicators in 
2002—2006, with the first three countries by 30 per cent or more. The indi-
cators of Moldova, Tajikistan and Georgia remained markedly lower. Yet, 
the mutual trade of the CIS countries was characterized by a steady tendency 
of lagging behind in trade with other countries in the world that is, distant 
foreign countries. If in 1994 its share in the total foreign trade turnover of the 
Commonwealth accounted for more than 35 %, by 2005 it fell to 25 %, 
while in the EU it reached 60 %, in NAFTA — about 50 %, in MERCOSUR 
— 30 % of the total foreign trade turnover of these international and regional 
organizations [3]. 
As far as the disintegration impact is concerned, the global financial cri-
sis of 2008—2009 proved to be no less dangerous for the Commonwealth as 
it led to further cuts in production and in mutual trade turnover.  
 The third factor of disintegration was collapse of the Monetary Union 
in 1993 and withdrawal of the ruble in international payment and in the CIS, 
introduction of national currencies and later — limitation and in fact restric-
tions curtailing the scope of free trade which enhanced the noted tendencies.  
 The fourth disintegration factor, derived from the previous ones, was the 
result of multidirectional and changing over time geopolitical vectors of 
development (“pro-Russian”, “pro-Western”, “pro-Asian”, “multidirec-
tional”) of the ruling elites and selective “personal” politics of “promotion” 
and “containment” of Russia, the United States, the neighboring countries 
(Turkey, Iran, China), NATO, European Union, the Organization of Islamic 
Conference and other international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe, 
etc.). In this context Central Asia and the Caspian-Black Sea region of the 
Caucasus became areas of strategic interests of NATO and the United States 
because of production and transit (including potential) of energy via these 
territories to Europe of Russian, Kazakh, Azeri and Turkmen energy re-
sources, as well as combating drug trafficking, international terrorism and 
opposition of Western countries to Iran. The contradictions between the CIS 
countries in the field of energy policies contribute to increasing geopolitical 
tensions and to strengthening disintegration trends in the regional commu-
nity.  
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 The fifth factor is intensification of integration processes with Euro-
pean regional organization of the CIS countries and the neighboring coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet republics 
(especially their accession to NATO, the development of EU in 1999—
2007). This stimulated the authority of the “pro-Western” vector of devel-
opment among some national elites in the CIS. In its turn, the EU “warms 
up” this interest with new Euro-integration projects of complex nature (like 
“East Partnership” projects addressed first of all to the Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) as well as energy related projects 
(“Nabucco”, “White Stream”, etc.).  
 The sixth factor is mass emigration of Russian and Russian-speaking 
population of most countries of the Commonwealth to Russia (in the 1990s 
alone about 5 million people from more than twenty millions of the whole 
Russian Diaspora moved to Russia) thus creating for the countries and the 
migrants serious socio-economic problems. In addition to this, especially in 
Russia, there were millions of illegal labor migrants of indigenous peoples of 
these countries (especially the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Tajiks and Uzbeks).  
 The seventh factor was energy- geopolitical factor: related to economic 
and political contradictions and conflicts between the CIS countries because 
of energy resources (oil and gas primarily), their price, organization and 
direction of transportation, etc. Here the interests of the exporting countries 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), the transit 
countries (“transiters”) (the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Georgia) and the en-
ergy policy of primarily all European and Asian recipients of oil and gas 
come into conflict. The most conflict intensive are the relationships in the 
“energy triangle” of Russia-Ukraine-European Union.  
Finally, internal, mostly ethno-political conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Russia contributed to their estrangement. It led to the emer-
gence of unrecognized states (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Na-
gorno-Karabakh, Ichkeria). Domestic political instability and conflicts of the 
regional elites in the Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also contributed to 
it. This disintegration factor reached its maximum expression in August, 
2008 when there was a failed attempt of the Georgian military to solve its 
territorial and political problems (with the open support of the Ukraine and 
neutrality of other countries). This led to the eventual independence of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and to the beginning of their international recognition 
first by Russia, thus ensuring their military security, and later by other states. 
This brought about Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS, to severance of dip-
lomatic relations with Russia and to its leadership’s further enhancement of 
the Western vector of development.  
In the first decade of the new century formation of new and activisation 
of previously formed intergovernmental structures) in the post-Soviet space 
in the Eurasian regional community took place. It became a very important 
factor of strengthening regionalization “de jure” (of both integration and 
disintegration character). These organizations were: Central Asian Coopera-
tion Organization (since 1994), including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Uzbekistan and Russia (joined in 2004); Euro-Asian Economic Com-
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munity (EAEC) (since 1995) comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; Belarus and Russia Union (BRU) (Decem-
ber 1996); at the beginning economic, later political (“country's democratic 
choice”) GUAM organization comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova (since 1997) originally with the participation of Uzbekistan in 
1999—2004); political and military alliance of CIS countries — the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (since 2002), uniting the countries 
of EurAsEC and Armenia; Сommon Free Market Zone (CFMZ) an agree-
ment on the establishment of which was signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan and Ukraine in 2003, (given inconsistent, contradictory position of the 
latter). In 2006 it was decided to merge EurAsEC and the CAC which had 
similar objectives. 
 Thus, the most closely related international regional commonality in the 
CIS are now the countries- members of the Belarus-Russia Union(BRU), the 
EurAsEC and the Collective Security Treaty Organization — Russia, Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia. Georgia 
is the least integrated country in the Commonwealth. It declared its aim to 
withdraw from the CIS, quickly to join NATO and the European Union. 
Turkmenistan peruses principles of neutrality in international politics and is 
minimally involved in the structures of the CIS.  
 Besides there are further signs of Western and East Asian directions 
of the CIS member countries integration processes. They introduce new 
shades in the regionalization of the Eurasian part (sub-region) of the post-
Soviet space due to the political, economic and socio-cultural activities of 
Turkey (the resurgence of the ideology of “pan-tyurkizm”), due to the revi-
talization of the Organization for Economic Co-operation, the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Conference and others. 
In the East Asian area it concerns primarily the activities of the Asian-
Pacific Economic Community (APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO) (since 2001), comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Taji-
kistan, Uzbekistan and China; it also covers cross-border cooperation, for-
eign trade and the joint projects of Russia and China.  
 From the point of view of the “de facto” regionalization factors — 
physical, geographical, civilizational, ethnic, cultural, historical and exter-
nal- the sub-regional level of regionalization of the post-Soviet space in the 
four historical and cultural sub-regions is also very evident. These sub-
regions are: Euro-Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Baltic -Black Sea 
(Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), 
Central — Asian (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uz-
bekistan) and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Georgia). These de “facto” regional communities formed in the course of 
more than three centuries. Though they do not have their own international 
management function they are still quite robust.  
 Internal (within the sub-regions) ethno-cultural, civilizational, social, 
economic and political differences and similarities of these countries, their 
differences and preferences allow to distinguish one more fractional level of 
regionalization “de facto” — the intra-sub regional level, that is it is possi-
Nikolai Kaledin  
35 
ble to identify fractional regional communities — specific groups of coun-
tries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Belarus-Russia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia, 
Transnistria, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan- Central Asian group of coun-
tries, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-Azerbaijan.  
 Under the influence of the reasons discussed above, in some countries 
(Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajiki-
stan) there is an intra- country level of regionalization. It takes various 
forms: ethno-political, electoral, geopolitical, etc. There is also politico-
geographical regionalization of internal space based on the previously ex-
isting historical and cultural areas.  
Thus, Ukraine demonstrates physical and political differentiation in the 
two regions — the West-Central and the South-East; in Russia the tendency 
of autonomization of the subjects of the Federation (in 1990s) changed 
(since the early 2000)) for the trend of geopolitical integration: initially in 
six federal districts, and then in consolidation of some subjects by reducing 
their number; in Kyrgyzstan one can clearly see the differences between 
North and South; sustainable development of the country is impossible with-
out taking it into account. Examples of Moldova, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan are no less obvious.  
The examined diversity of a kind of “matryoshka of regionalization” and 
the dynamics of the processes of regionalization of the post-Soviet space 
point to the fact that, without exaggeration, it is here where for the last two 
decades there has been the epicenter of regionalization processes of the 
world. 
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